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ABSTRACT
A Downward Spiral; Young People, the Media, 
and Political Disengagement
by
Jacqueline M. Maloy
Dr. Lawrence Mullen, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Communication 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study examines whether political disengagement is related to the amount 
and/or type of television that young people watch. The study was conducted through 
survey research at University of Nevada, Las Vegas, with over one hundred 
undergraduate participants. It demonstrates that there is no relationship between the 
amount of television which students watch and their political engagement. However, it 
also demonstrates that there is a relationship between the types of television programs 
which students watch and their attitudes toward politics and politicians. Frequent 
viewers of local news feel less trusting toward the government in Washington, whereas 
frequent viewers of late-night talk shows feel greater trust toward politics and politicians. 
Further, there is a relationship between the types of programs which students watch and 
their level of political involvemenL Frequent viewers of local news, network news, and 
political talk shows are more involved with politics than less frequent viewers.
itt
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CHAPTER!
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, young people between the ages of 18 to 24 have the lowest 
voting participation rate of any age group in the voting-age population (Hall & Jones, 
1998). Have young adults simply become more alienated from the political process than 
their elders? Is this an understandable reaction to growing up in an era of major political 
scandals, including Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, and Whitewater? This chapter will 
examine several theories as to why young adults seem disengaged from the electoral 
process, including the effects of the mass media. The following chapters will describe a 
survey research project through which young people’s political attitudes will be 
measured. In this survey project, an adaptation of Gerbneifs cultivation theory will be 
used to look at relationships between indicators of political disengagement and mass 
media use, specifically television viewing. This study suggests that political attitudes and 
activity are tied to media use, which creates a downward spiral of interest in politics for 
the younger generation. Thus, as young people rely more on television for political cues, 
they become more and more disenchanted with politicians, campaigns, and government 
in general.
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Describing cultivation theory, Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli (1982) 
write that “the assumptions, beliefs, and values of heavy viewers differ systematically 
from those of light viewers in the same demographic groups” (p. 104). This study will 
explore the possibility that college-aged heavy television viewers feel more negatively 
toward government than their counterparts who are light viewers. When studying 
perceptions of violence, Gerbner (1972) found that heavy viewers believe that much 
more violence exists in the world than do light viewers. According to Jeffres (1997), 
Gerbner “concluded that television viewing cultivated this distorted view of a ‘mean and 
scary world’” (p. 87). Instead of violence, this study focuses on perceptions of 
government, politics, and politicians, and hypothesizes that heavy viewers who are young 
adults cultivate the view of a negative and untrustworthy government—the Government 
Is Bad (and Boring) hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, if heavy viewers believe 
that government is bad, they will also be less inclined to pay attention to elections, feel as 
though they can make a difference (internal efBcacy), or become politically involved.
The hypothesis is based on the ideas that I) news coverage of politicians and campaigns 
encourage a negative view of politics, 2) entertainment shows, such as late night talk 
shows, tend to treat politicians derisively, and 3) young viewers find little political 
information on television that is dfrected specifically toward them, either in content or 
style.
Some of the hypotheses in this study will also be based on Putnam’s (1994,1995) 
theory on the erosion of social capital. Accordmg to this theory, people spend more time 
watching television and less tune involved m social and community interaction. This, he 
argues, has caused a declme in civic and polMcal engagement
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
My interest in this topic stems from teaching an introductory speech course to 
students in this age group in 1999. Practically everyone in the class expressed a dislike 
of politics. While the author’s “thirty-something” peers followed President Clinton’s 
“intem-gate” troubles with avid interest, these students did not pay attention even to this 
salacious scandal. Although some communication scholars might consider this a sensible 
response to the overheated reporting of the Lewinsky story, students seem equally 
uninterested in local issues, such as the conduct code at University of Las Vegas, water 
conservation in the desert, and the governor’s plan to give college scholarships to high 
school students who graduate with a B average or higher. The author’s concerns grew 
when a colleague, a philosophy teacher, told about a class in which students insisted the 
word “politician” was always a pejorative term or dysphemism.
It seems that these students may represent a national trend. Strama (1998) writes, 
“Seven out of ten young people between the %es of 18 and 24 did not vote in the 1996 
presidential elections. A 1997 UCLA survey of college freshmen nationwide finds their 
interest in politics at a thirty-year low” (p. 71). This generation will soon lead the United 
States. Should there be concern at their lack of civic participation and their seeming 
disinterest in politics overall? If young people think that the very idea of being a 
politician is suspect, what will that mean fr>r the future of American democracy?
In order to answer these questions, this chapter will review several quantitative 
studies and qualitative papers that focus on youth and political disengagement. Some of 
these studies deal specifically with members of “Generation X.” This generational label 
became popular because of Douglas Coupland’s novel of the same name, written in 1991, 
and usually applies to those bom between 1961 and 1981. Other researchers compare the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
political attitudes of Generation X to the generation that came directly before them—the 
Baby Boomers. Writers generally use the term Baby Boomers to describe those people 
bom in the 15 to 20 years after World War U. Still other research looks at the 
characteristics of today’s youngest possible voters, the Millennials, bom from 1982 
through 2005.
First, the chapter will cover whether or not young adults have always exhibited 
less interest in politics than older adults. Next, it will show how the American public on 
the whole feels more disengaged from politics, and will note theories as to why the 
cynicism exists. Then, the paper will focus on characteristics of Generation X and 
Millennials, including several scholars’ theories as to why these young people exhibit 
even less interest in politics than the rest of Americans. In the next section, the chapter 
will review studies on how marketing forces and the media target political messages to 
young Americans, and how young Americans respond to these messages. In the final 
section, the chapter will focus on media effects, and how media effects and political 
attitudes will be analyzed in the next four chapters.
Political Participation of Young Adults Over Time
Have young Americans always been much more disengaged from politics than 
their elders? If we answer “yes,” then we should not feel any particular alarm now. 
Indeed, while older adults may worry about why college-age students do not vote, 
college-age students were only given the opportunity in recent decades. It wasn’t  until 
1972 that the federal law lowered the voting age people from 21 to 18—the age at which 
American men could be drafted (Bennett & Craig, 1997).
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In the introduction to After the Boom: The Politics of Generation K Bennett and 
Craig (1997) describe some of the challenges for those who study generations. For 
example, when looking at political participation of youth over time, researchers must 
consider “aging or life cycle ” effects (Bennett & Craig, 1997). Life cycle effects account 
for the fact that people face similar stmggles at similar points in life. For example, 
young people might always tend to show less interest in politics because at that point in 
their lives, they spend their time establishing a career and finding a mate. Bennett and 
Craig (1997) go on to explain why researchers need to consider life cycle effects when 
looking at generational demographic data:
Although. . .  long-term research focus is rare . . .  those who study political 
generations must nonetheless consider the possibility that whatever age-based 
differences they observe in their (usually) cross-sectional data are due to life­
cycle factors rather than generational change. If, for example, we look at a public 
opinion survey in 1996 and learn that young adults are less likely to identify with 
a political party than are older citizens, should we assume that this is because the 
former constitute a less partisan generation, that is, they have been shaped by 
events in such a way that they will probably remain less supportive of parties for 
the rest of their lives? Or is it because the political identities of young people 
have not yet fully developed, and thus they tend in any historical era to be less 
partisan than then: elders (p, 7)?
Bennett and Craig (1997) suggest that researchers can best study life-cycle e&cts by 
ft>Uowing a group of individuals throughout their lives, measuring attitudes and behaviors 
at regular intervals. The researchers would need to compare the patterns of the group
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
studied to the patterns found in the population overall. This is difficult but necessary 
work.
In his study of political apathy, Bennett (1986) developed a “Political Apathy 
Index,” by using surveys to measure both campaign interest and attention to public 
affairs. Bennett, using data collected from I960 to 1984, found that:
young Americans have consistently paid less attention to public affairs than either 
the middle-aged or (in most cases) the elderly, despite having the advantage of 
more years of formal schooling (a factor that is strongly and inversely related to 
apathy), (p. 26)
Bennett and Rademacher’s (1997) statistical study of the forces responsible for 
political apathy compared the political involvement of Early Boomers, Late Boomers, 
and Gen-Xers when each group was between 18 and 26 years old. These authors define 
Early Boomers as those bom between 1946 and 1954, Late Boomers as those bom 
between 1955 and 1964, and Gen-Xers as those bom between 1965 and 1978. These 
researchers performed regression analyses on 1972 data for Early Boomers, 1980 data for 
Late Boomers, and 1992 data for Gen-Xers. The authors used “race, gender, marital 
status, education, occupation, income, strength of partisan identification, and concem 
about which party would win the election” as variables (p. 28). Fust, the researchers 
found that education serves as the factor most strongly correlated to interest in politics. 
Second, they found real differences between the generations. For example, gender 
usually correlates with political interest, but it was not a factor in 1972, when the 
Women’s Movement was at its height. Third, for Gen.-Xers, ident^dng with other young 
people predicted a lack of interest in politics. This last pomt is particularly intriguing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
since, as Bennett and Rademacher (1997) note, any group identification usually predicts a 
greater interest in politics.
Mass Cynicism and American Politics Today
Many writers who cover politics and communication argue that the American 
population on the whole shows more cynicism about the political process than previous 
generations (Dionne, 1991; Hart, 1999). In their book. The Spiral of Cynicism. Cappella 
and Jamieson (1997) note findings of the National Opinion Research Center Survey, 
which show that in 1970, 75 percent of respondents said that they felt either a great deal 
or a fair amount of confidence in the government as a problem solver. By 1993, only 42 
percent gave the same answer to this survey question. Why? Some researchers seek to 
explain this general alienation as an effect of political news coverage. Bennett (1997), for 
example, writes about her content analysis of print and broadcast “ad watches” during the 
1996 presidential elections. In ad watches, news analysts review political advertisements 
for false information. Bennett contends that the election coverage focuses on the 
strategies that campaigners use, rather than on the issues campaigners address. The ad 
watchers editorialize about dishonest politics, and the public concludes that politicians 
are self-serving liars.
In Seducing America: How Television Charms the Modem Voter. Hart (1999) 
argues that television, especially with shows such as PolMcallv Incorrect encourages 
cynicism and the belief that “having an attitude” counts for more than having knowledge. 
Hart also believes that television, with its focus on political personalities instead of 
issues, encourages its audience to feel infatuated with candidates who speak well and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8show their emotions. The audience becomes terribly disillusioned when the candidates, 
with whom they feel intimate, let them down in some way. The public then, according 
to Hart, becomes cynical. Further, Hart suggests that because Americans watch 
politicians and political analysts on television, they feel the illusion of taking part in the 
political process without needing to vote.
Another explanation for the mass cynicism about the political process is that it 
results from “culture wars” in political discourse that caused a kind of national identity 
crisis. Belief in the political process seems to require a concem about groups beyond 
one’s own. These culture wars, perhaps, made each group’s members feel less 
sympathetic to members of other groups. Irving Kristol defined culture wars as 
“profound division over what kind of country we are, what kind of people we are, and 
what we mean by ‘The American Way of Life’” (Strauss & Howe, 1997, p. 203). 
Individuals may now feel more concemed about their own groups, and less concemed 
about the members of other groups because, as Strauss and Howe (1997) contend:
The Culture Wars had as many combatants as America had niches, from the 
Nation of Islam to the Intemet. As each group exalted its own authenticity, it 
defined its adversary’s values as indecent, stupid, obscene, or (a suddenly popular 
word) evü. (p. 203)
In Todd Gitlin’s (1995) book on the culture wars, called The Twilight of 
Common Dreams, the author asserts that the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s saw itself 
as questioning and attacking the traditional values of American society. The New Left 
defined these traditional values as the interests of straight wAite men. Even if their 
dream s were not as radical as those mvolved believed, by separating themselves, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
members of the New Left allowed the Right to claim the ideas of a “common America” 
(p. 73).
On the other hand, in his address at the American Political Science Association, 
Bennett (1998) argues that instability in the Job market caused a breakdown in the 
traditional institutions in American society. As American companies let go of their 
workers, these workers and their children grew more distrustful of institutions in general. 
These American workers, Bennett believes, do not trust that traditional government will 
provide solutions to these uncertain economic conditions.
In The Fourth Turning. Strauss and Howe (1997) examine cycles of history to 
find generational shifts and patterns of social experience. These writers refer to the late 
1990s as a time of “unraveling.” They say that the country is in a dark mood because the 
end of the Cold War has produced a New World Order that feels unstable. Americans in 
the 90s have seen the failure of health care reform, and have stopped believing that 
institutions could solve their problems for them. The 0. J. Simpson trial and the Million 
Man March showed a new kind of “racialism” in the culture (Strauss & Howe, 1997, p. 
206). Certainly, this author would add the Clinton/Lewinslty scandal -including how the 
government and the media handled the presidential crisis—to the issues that might make 
Americans in general more likely to distrust institutions.
Like these other writers, Jonathan Cowan (1997) sees Americans in general as 
losmg interest in the political system. In his essay on today’s youth, Cowan speaks as the 
founder of the youth movement “Lead or Leave,” an organization dedicated to solving 
the United States’ deficit problenu Cowan states that “differences among generations 
when measuring citizen disengagement and frustration with politics are realty in degree
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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but not in kind. We’re ail fed up with politics as usual” (p. 196). Nonetheless, even if 
any or all of these theories about American cynicism prove true, they fail to explain why 
young people especially disengage themselves from the electoral process.
Specific Characteristics of Today’s Young Adults 
What factors make today’s 18- to 24-year-olds particularly inclined toward 
cynicism? Certainly, media scholars have written much about the special issues for those 
in Generation X. Researchers generally define Generation X as being those bom between 
1961 and 1981 (Strauss and Howe, 1991). This definition expands Gen X beyond “20- 
somethings” to include those who are in their mid-thirties, and allows the use of the 
wealth of demographic materials published about this Post Baby-Boom group. In their 
book. Generations. Strauss and Howe (1991) use the label “Thirteeners” to describe this 
thirteenth generation of Americans, and note the following:
Far more than other generations, 13ers feel that the real world is gearing 
up to punish them down the road. Annual polls of high school seniors show that 
those bom just after 1960 came of age much more fearful of national catastrophe 
than those bom just before. These early 1960s babies...  grew up as the kids 
whose low test rates and high rates of crime, suicide, and substance abuse marked 
a postwar extreme for American youth. 317)
Strauss and Howe (1991) explain this negative picture by describing the way 
these 13ers were brought up. While those bom in the early 1960s had to compete with 
the Baby Boomers, parents mainly left those bom in the 1970s on their own. Indeed, 
during the 1970s, the number of “latchkey” children doubled. The 13ers are the children
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Il
of broken families who grew up in a time of diminishing economic expectations. Their 
parents were busy “self-actualizing” through their careers and personal lives, without 
making the sacrifices for their children that their parents had made for them.
In her unpublished Masters’ thesis, Paula Gottula Miles (1997) reviews much of 
the communication literature about Generation X. She notes that 40 percent of the 
members of this generation grew up in a family where their parents divorced, compared 
to just 11 percent of Boomers. Miles suggests that guilt-ridden mothers who went off to 
work tried to make up for the lost time with their children by buying them toys. Media 
gained a new importance for this generation—while the children were at home alone, 
television became their constant companion. According to the 1995 Statistical Abstracts. 
by the time an average child reaches the age of five, he or she has watched over 5000 
hours of television, including 1000 hours of commercials targeting products to them 
(Miles, 1997). The media and guilt-ridden parents, according to this theory, helped to 
create a generation of materialistic young adults who want to have it all, and are bitter 
when they don’t get it. In order to afford material goods, more members of this 
generation continue to live with their parents beyond the age of 18.
Miles (1997) also contends that both because television content changed and 
because parents were not home to guide television use, these young people, during 
childhood, watched television with more adult themes than Baby Boomers before them. 
Young adult books of the ‘70s, ‘80s, and ‘90s also dealt with fearful subject matter, such 
as divorce, teen-age sex, and drug use, for the ffist time. These media-saturated children 
largely had to figure out for themselves how best to make sense of these scary issues, 
which perhaps left them feeling cynical and distrustful toward older adults.
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Miles (1997) adds that members of Generation X do not commit to institutions or 
people easily. In their lifetimes, they have seen that loyalty to a corporation does not 
guarantee continued employment. Even with college education, members of this 
generation have a harder time finding good jobs, with so many Baby Boomers ahead of 
them. Also, after being brought up by career-occupied parents, Gen-Xers seem reluctant 
to give work the same priority in their own lives. Finally, Miles notes that having 
wimessed their parents’ divorces, many Gen-Xers wait longer to get married themselves 
(Miles, 1997).
The Millennials, on the other hand, are being brought up by more carefully 
nurturing Late Boomer parents. According to Strauss and Howe (1991), the first members 
of this generation were bom in 1982. These generational scholars note that at around the 
same time, a large number of books were published calling on parents to think carefully 
about the effects on children of education with no instruction in values, latchkey 
households, and divorce. These children also benefited from a new chUd-fiiendly trend in 
Hollywood. The state governments, too, took a more protective stance toward this 
generation, enacting safety measures such as the infant restraint laws for automobiles and 
bicycle helmet laws. Quality education has become a greater political priority for parents 
of these children than it was for the parents of Gen-Xers. However, these young people 
still have had to deal with the effects of divorce and the fact that even if both parents stay 
together, they most likely both have jobs (Strauss & Howe, 1991). In the election of 
2000, the first of these Millennials will have the opportunity to vote. Whether or not they 
will begin to reverse the trend toward apathy, given the fact that the government gave 
them more attention and protection, will be a focus of future study.
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Political Participatioii and Today’s Young Adults 
Are young people really so uniquely disengaged? Bennett (1998) states that 
although young people find “lifestyle politics” more compelling than traditional 
organized political group activity, they do actively engage with these more personal 
political concerns. The young writer Michele Mitchell (1998) takes issue with the idea of 
her generation’s apathy, writing A New Kind o f  Party Animal to draw attention to her 
peers’ involvement in social issues. Mitchell wrote the book partly as a response to the 
media’s charges of apathy against her generation.
Strauss and Howe (1991) note that in a report, “Democracy’s Next Generation,” 
by pollster Peter Hart, only 12 percent of “13ers” described voting as a characteristic of 
good citizenship. However, 48 percent believed that generosity was an important 
attribute of citizenship. Strauss and Howe describe 13ers attitudes this way:
When you vote, maybe you’ll waste your time—or, worse, later feel tricked. But 
when you do something real, like bringing food to the homeless, you do 
something that matters, if only on a small scale. The president of MIT has 
likened the 13ers civic attitude to that of the Lone Ranger: Do a good deed, leave 
a silver bullet, and move on. (p. 333)
On the other hand, the former acting head of Rock the Vote, Mark Strama (1998), 
contends in an essay on youth participation that while young people in the 1990s 
volunteer in record numbers, this volunteerism does not translate into belief in the power 
of social movements for change. Strama writes ,“They seemed to view the political side 
of these issues as maccessible and intractable, focusing instead on the satisfaction of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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serving an immediate need in then: community,” (1998, p. 72). Others, such as UNLV 
Professor Ronald Wilbum, theorize more cynically that young people volunteer because 
they have to in order to get into the better colleges (personal interviews, 1999).
As a founder of an advocacy group for young people, Jonathan Cowan (1997) 
writes in his essay about young people and politics that traditional political caimot be 
replaced. Cowan believes that though volunteerism can help build community, it cannot 
substitute for political activity such as voting. Vermont Democratic Representative Matt 
Dunne (1997) quotes the results of a student poll in his essay on youth and political 
leadership. The poll findings show that while young people do want to make a difference 
in the world, they simply believe that “meaningful social change cannot be achieved 
through traditional American politics” (p. 253).
Other writers have looked at lack of party identification as an important piece of 
the apathy puzzle. Dennis and Owen’s (1997) study examined data from the 1994 
American National Election Study to measinre party identification and loyalty. These 
researchers point out that members of Generation X do not identify with political parties 
as strongly as previous generations did. This generation, according to Dennis and Owen, 
get their political cues directly from television, and do not have (or take) the opportunity 
to participate in political discussions with family members or peers. This leaves them 
less entrenched in the political world, with fewer cues on how to vote. Their study 
showed that Xers “are the cohort least likely to reject strongly the proposition that ‘we 
probably don’t need political parties m America anymore’ and the one least inclined to 
support continuation of the two-party tystem in its present form” (p. 59).
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Marketing Forces and the Media 
With young people relying more and more on television for their political cues, 
how is television responding to their need? The evidence suggests that 18 to 24 year olds 
do not participate in the political process. Perhaps it is because mainstream political 
culture has decided to ignore the young.
In his essay on public intellectuals, Giroux (1997) suggests that marketing 
researchers “represent one of the few groups that appear attentive to how youth think, 
feel, behave, and desnre” (p. 193). Giroux contends the entertainment media have 
consistently portrayed these American youths in negative terms, especially young black 
males. The media’s interests, Giroux believes, lie mainly in raising consumers, not active 
citizens. Portrayed alternately as shallow hedonists or as “violent sociopaths” (p. 192), 
Giroux suggests that media exploit youth, while public issues such as education and 
health care disappear from public discourse, especially in media directed toward young 
people. No wonder, then, that young people remain uninformed.
Miles (1997), however, asserts that because marketers do not understand this 
generation’s attitudes and rhetoric, “politicians and advertisers cannot succeed in 
appealing to or manipulating this vast and diverse group” (p. 5). She believes that young 
people today grew particularly media savvy because of the amount of time they spent 
watching television as children. They feel skeptical about advertising and marketmg 
messages because they learned at an early age that they might well be disappointed in the 
products advertised. In other words, they learned that advertisers misrepresent their 
products.
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On the other hand, in an article discussing the uneasy “marriage” of popular 
culture and politics, van Zoonen (1998) writes that popular political communication does 
somewhat successfully direct some programming toward young people. Van Zoonen 
gives the example of MTV and the “Rock the Vote” campaigiL This campaign made it 
impossible for a traditional politician like George Bush to ignore the medium of the 
young. While it did not “get out the vote” in impressive numbers, “Rock the Vote” did 
help young people form opinions about the candidates, and in some cases, gave the 
candidates the opportunity to forge a coimection with them (van Zoonen, 1998). Van 
Zoonen concludes that popular culture and politics will grow ever closer.
Owen (1997) conducted a generational study using data gathered in 1992 and 
1994 by the American National Election Surveys, as well as findings firom the 1996 
Youth Voice Survey, which surveyed 1200 Americans between age 18 and 24. Owen 
(1997) concludes that “most Xers do not identify with any current leader, not even Bill 
Clinton, despite his efforts to reach out to them during his 1992 campaign” (p. 97). She 
also finds a significant gap in the level of patriotism between younger and older 
generations, despite efforts on the part of political parties to inspire such patriotism.
Finally, in then introduction to After the Boom, a book about politics and 
Generation X, Bennett and Rademacher (1997) contend that because Gen Xers do not 
use media to learn about public affoirs, th^r remain ignorant of political events. Further, 
they write, “Thomas Jefferson once noted that there never has been, nor ever will be, a 
people who are at once both politically ignorant and fiee” (p. 39).
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Media Effects and Directions for Research 
According to my thesis, young people rely more heavily on the media for political 
information and attitudes while at the same time they are less apt to be engaged in 
discussion about politics with family and ftiends. A previous study (Maloy, 1999), found 
a moderately strong correlation (r = .517, p < .001) between the amount of time spent 
discussing politics with Mends and concern about who will win the next presidential 
election. Similarly, a moderately strong correlation (r = .448, p. < .001) was found 
between discussion of political issues with family and concern about who will win the 
next presidential election. The students who have discussions are most concerned about 
who will become president. However, many other students do not often take part in these 
discussions. In this same study, 44% of those surveyed responded that they “rarely” 
discuss political issues with Mends and family, and another 16% responded that they 
discussed political issues less than “once or twice a month.”
With discussion less frequent, the media's hnpact may be growing. After 
conducting four focus groups to determine voter response to campaign messages during 
the 1996 presidential election, Kem (1997) found that political advertisements and news 
coverage remforce the public's mistrust of politicians. McChesney (1999) argues that 
media enforce the status quo because it is in their mterests for an uninterested majority to 
let corporate powers govern.
According to MacManus (1996), one quarter of Americans between the ages of 
18 to 29 watch late night TV talk shows regularly. One third of these viewers 
acknowledge that they hear news about candidates and campaigns on these shows that
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they have not heard elsewhere. As the comedians on these shows make politicians seem 
absurd, perhaps young Americans get reinforcement for their disinclination toward 
political activity. Through survey research, this study will explore the connection 
between young people’s television use and political apathy.
The second chapter will include reviews of literature covering theories of how 
political socialization occurs and how political identifications are formed. The chapter 
will then review literature that deals specifically with television media effects, focusing 
particular attention on Putnam’s theory on the erosion of social capital and Gerbner’s 
cultivation theory (1972). As Jeffires (1997) notes on cultivation, “This theory sees media 
images molding society by the long-term presentation of relatively uniform versions of 
social reality” (p. 86).
The literature review will include a recent study by Norris (1996) which shows 
that heavy television viewing is associated with lower political participation rates. This 
same study, according to Beimett (1998), shows that viewing television news and public 
affairs is associated with higher rates of political participation, a finding that is especially 
interesting given that young people are not the targeted demographic group for those 
shows. The literature review wül also include a study conducted by Moy, Pfau, and 
Kahlor (1999) which examines media use and public confidence in democratic 
institutions, along with Pfku, Moy, Radier and Bridgeman’s (1998) study of how 
individual communication media influence public confidence m democratic institutions.
The third chapter will outline the methodology for the survey study. This study 
involves a convenience sample of over one hundred University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
undergraduate students. The survey mcludes questions about the role of government in
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society, how involved and engaged students are (or plan to be) in the current political 
campaign, attitudes toward government institutions, the news media, and politics in 
general, and how much interest they have in politics. The survey also includes questions 
about the number of hours students spend watching television. It is designed to test the 
specific hypotheses about the effects of heavy use of television on (1) feelings of political 
efficacy, (2) interest in politics, (3) political involvement, (4) assessments of politics and 
politicians, and (5) trust in government institutions.
The predictor variables of the study are the average amounts of daily television 
exposure, as well as the types of programs watched most fiequently. These wül be taken 
from responses to survey questions.
The criterion variables are political self-identification, feelings about the role of 
government in society, political involvement, feelings of internal efficacy, and attitudes 
toward government, including confidence and trust levels. The survey takes less than 30 
minutes for students to complete.
The fourth chapter wül analyze and discuss the results of the survey. Finally, the 
fifth chapter wül propose directions for future research, based on the results of this study.
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to establish the importance of television as a factor in forming political 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, this chapter will first review articles and books that 
address theories of political socialization. The chapter will then cover literature that deals 
with the relationship between television viewing and political engagement. Though two 
different theories will be explored, both have in common the idea that those who are 
heavy television viewers have a lower level of political engagement than lighter viewers. 
The chapter will also set forth the five hypotheses and two research questions that this 
study seeks to address.
Political Socialization 
Political socialization, also sometimes referred to as politicization, is the means 
by which people gain their political knowledge and ideas as well as the motivation to act 
on this knowledge and these ideas. One might look at the factors that are generally 
considered to be involved in political socialization to find out whether these have 
changed for members of Generation X. This might help to explain their lack of 
engagement with politics and government.
According to Dennis and Owen (1997), theorists such as Hyman (1959) and 
Greenstein (1960) wrote that in the United States, "the foundations of political learning
20
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and political identity are thought to be established during the childhood years" (p. 49). 
Sigel(1989) writes that Hyman believed such socialization would essentially be finished 
by the high school years. Political scientists such as Easton and Dennis (1969) asserted 
that in childhood, young people look up to political figures as trustworthy and deserving 
of affection. According to this theory, these positive attitudes make it possible for the 
adult to maintain a reservoir of goodwill toward government and politicians, even afier the 
childlike sentiments have been tempered by skepticism (Stgel, 1989). These political 
science theorists viewed the family, as well as school and peer groups, to be of primary 
importance in helping to inculcate political attitudes, values, and behaviors.
Dennis and Owen (1997) argue that this kind of socialization model, which 
stresses the importance of family and early learning, is not as useful for those studying 
Generation X as it is for studying other, earlier age cohorts. This is because of the 
changing structure of the American family during the time that members of Generation X 
were children. As discussed in Chapter I, many of these children grew up in single­
parent households. Divorce rates increased at a rapid pace. At the same time, many 
women went to work. According to Dennis and Owen (1997), "Parents were left with 
less time and perhaps less inclination to teach then progeny about politics. As a result, 
Gen-Xers often received fewer, less direct, and less homogenous political cues firom 
family members over the course of their preadult political development" (p. 49).
Dennis and Owen (1997) believe that because of these changes in the family, Gen- 
Xers are not as fully formed in their political identities when they reach voting age. They 
further argue that the mass media play an enormous role in givingpolitical cues to these 
young people. For example, they cite a Wtsconsm study conducted in 1980-81 which
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found that only 16 percent of preadult Gen-Xers got most of their political information 
from their parents, while 30 percent of those surveyed got most of their political 
information from television. The importance of mass media has not dhnmished for adult 
Gen-Xers, according to Global Strategy Group 1996 data, which showed that 54 percent 
of adult Gen-Xers studied receive most of their political information from television 
(Dennis & Owen, 1997).
Graber (1984) contends that most of the political information that children receive 
comes from the mass media. If this is true, then perhaps it has been more difficult for 
children in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to form the kind of idealization of political figures 
that Easton and Dennis (1969) argued was desirable in political socialization. When 
members of Generation X were growing up, the mass media showed presidents involved 
in scandal—Nixon in Watergate, Reagan and Bush in the Iran-Contra episode, and, most 
recently, Clinton in Whitewater and the Lewinslqr affair.
Further, Graber (1984) argues that when adults are resocialized—that is, when 
they acquire new attitudes and ideas about politics in adulthood, it happens as a result of 
information they get from mass media. She cites the shifts in attitudes toward race and 
sex since the 1940s and 1950s as examples of such resocialization. Sigel(1989) agrees 
with the perspective that socialization does not end at high school, and that a variety of 
agents can continue to play a role in adult political socialization. For Generation X and 
the Millennials, television has played an especially important role in socialization 
throughout childhood, and may continue to be important throughout the adult years, as 
resocialization takes place. The literature review that follows will address two theories of
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how mass media use is related to the political attitudes, involvement, interest levels, and 
feelings of efficacy.
Definitions of Terms 
Just what is political engagement and how does it relate to other measures of 
attitude and involvement, such as apathy, interest, cynicism, involvement, engagement, 
confidence, and efficacy? Before reviewing relevant studies and relating them to this 
study’s hypotheses, it is first necessary to define precisely how the terms political 
engagement, cynicism, and interest are being used in this study.
Political engagement. In Broken Contract researchers Horn and Conway (1996) 
write:
By ‘political engagement’ we mean interest in and attention to politics. Indicators 
of engagement might include having a general interest in governmental and political 
afiairs, following political campaigns, discussing political issues and candidates 
with fiiends or family, and consuming the mass media’s political content 
regardless of the format through which that content is conveyed.” (p. 110)
Horn and Conway (1996) measure engagement by using the same ANES survey 
questions that measure interest in and attentiveness to politics. Political disengagement, it 
would follow, is a lack of interest m and attention to politics. In this study, 
disengagement is used as the umbrella term for many negative feelings toward politics, and 
thus wül be used in a broader fashion. One who is disengaged could be described as bemg 
distrustful and unsure of his or her own efficacy, as well as bemg disinterested and 
mattentive to politics.
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Cynicism and trust, Erber and Lan (1990) equate political cynicism with distrust, 
which is essentially how this study uses the term. Along with answering items adapted 
from the American National Election Study (ANES) surveys (Craig, 1996) that were 
specially designed to measure trust in government, students have also been asked to 
identify their own level of cynicism. Students are left to use their own understanding of 
the term, as the survey provides no further definition.
Apathy aad interest. Political scientist Stephen Earl Bennett (1986), in creating 
his Political Apathy Index, attempted to rid the term “apathy” from such possible 
meanings as absence of participation, psychopathological dispositions, and even trust, 
cynicism, and alienation. Instead, Bennett uses the following, limited definition of the 
term: “The concept of political apathy refers to the varying degrees to which people are 
or are not interested in and attentive to politics and public afiairs” (p. 37). Throughout 
this study, Bennett’s definition will apply.
Efficacy, In After the Boom. Owen (1997) defines feelings of political efficacy as 
follows: “. . .  the belief that one has the ability to effectively influence the political 
process through voting and other forms of active involvement” (p. 87). She goes on to 
explain that efficacy is related more closely to participation than is the concept of trust 
Owen’s definition will apply throughout this study.
The Erosion of Social Capital
Putnam’s Theory
In recent years, Putnam (1994,1995) has described the importance of social 
capital in the United States. According to Norris (199Q, “’Social capital’ is understood
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as the dense networks of norms and social trust which enable participants to cooperate in 
the pursuit of shared objectives” (p. 474). In The Great Disruption. Fukuyama (1999) 
explains why social capital is so important to the functioning of a democratic society. He 
claims that it is social capital that impressed Alexis de Toqueville so much during his 
travels in the United States. Fukuyama writes that de Toqueville believed the following: 
American democracy and its system of limited government worked only because 
Americans were so adept at forming associations for both civil and political 
purposes. This ability to, in effect, self-organize not only meant that the 
government did not have to impose order in a hierarchical, top-down manner; civil 
association was also a “school of self-government” that taught people cooperative 
habits they would carry over with them to public life. (p. 20)
Pumam (1994, 1995) argues that for social capital and trust to exist, individuals 
need to interact with one another in the community. Looking at the decline of group 
membership in general, Putnam (1994,1995) asserts that social capital has eroded over 
the past several decades as, he believes, people spend less time interacting with each 
other. One of the reasons that people spend less time interacting and therefore have less 
social capital, according to his argument, is that people in the past few decades spend so 
much of their time watching television. Fukuyama (1999) notes that the average 
American watches television for more than four hours a day. This certainly would seem 
to limit the time that they spend in face-to-face interaction.
Trust, as well as group membership, is an important indicator of social capital. 
Pfou, Moy, Radier and Bridgeman (1998) cite research that shows declming levels of trust 
in the Presidency, Congress, the news media, and government at the state level. Putnam
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(1994,1995) argues that the decline in trust is correlated with the increasing amount of 
time that Americans have spent watching television and is most pronounced in the post­
war generation (Norris, 1996). If the Baby Boom generation has lost social capital and 
feelings of trust because their leisure and social group activities were displaced by 
television, this author would argue that the same holds true for members of Generation X. 
Putnam’s theory on the decline in social capital might therefore be important in explaining 
young adults’ rising levels of political disengagement.
Putnam (1994,1995) reviewed the decline of many difîèrent types of group 
membership (from bowling leagues to Parent-Teacher Associations to political parties) in 
his research. This study, however, will focus on how this erosion of social capital affects 
political engagement. In a study that used items measuring attention to television, 
political participation, political interest, and efficacy, Norris (1996) found the following: 
“people who watch a great deal of television know less about politics, feel less able to 
affect government, and are less interested in politics” (p. 478). Given Norris’s findings, 
the following predictions were made:
HI: Heavy use of television by students is negatively related to feelings of 
political efficacy.
H2: Heavy use of television by students is negatively related to interest in 
politics and government
Putnam (1995) found in his analysis of survey research that heavy television 
viewing was associated with lower voting turnout and less social trust In light of 
Putnam’s findings, the followmg prediction was made:
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H3: Heavy use of television by students is negatively related to political 
involvement.
The next section of the paper will look at Gerbner’s cultivation theory and how 
the largely negative portrayal of politics and government on television might affect heavy 
viewers of television.
The Cultivation Process
The cultivation theory, proposed by George Gerbner, focuses on how television 
presents the world, and on how long term exposure to this television world affects 
people’s attitudes, beliefs, and values (Gerbner et al., 1984). According to Gerbner,
Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli (1986), "Television cultivates from infancy the very 
predispositions and preferences that used to be acquired from other primary sources" (p.
18). These researchers believe that social scientists need to look at the total picture of 
how television is used, and not simply at how specific types of programs affect viewers. 
Indeed, these writers observe that, "What matters most for the study of television is not 
so much what this or that viewer may prefer as what virtually no viewer can escape" 
(Gerbner et al., 1986, p. 20).
Cultivation theory differs from earlier media effects research because it does not 
emphasize the effects of a particular campaign or a specific type of marketing effort, but 
rather how television use in general affects the viewer (Gerbner et al., 1986). According 
to Gerbner et al. (1984) the effects of television might be very difficult to measure 
because television is everywhere and its message is fairly homogenous. This means that 
even non-viewers and light viewers may be indirectly influenced by television through
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their discussions with heavier viewers. If differences are found between light and heavy 
viewers, it may be crucial in understanding how television makes an impact.
The theory was first proposed and tested in studies that focused on how 
television exposure affected perceptions of violence in the world (e.g., Gerbner, 1972, 
Gerbner & Gross, 1976, Gerbner, Gross, Eleey, Jackson-Breeck, Jeffiies-Fox, & 
Signorielli, 1977). Through this series of studies, researchers found differences between 
light and heavy viewers. Heavy viewers of television were more likely to have a distorted 
view of social reality than light viewers were. The heavy viewers perceived that violence 
was much more prevalent than it actually was.
Gerbner’s work on cultivation is part of a larger program of research called 
Cultural Indicators, which is conducted at the Annenberg School of Communication at the 
University of Pennsylvania (Jeffies, 1997). Cultural Indicators also focuses research on 
how policies are made that affect the creation and flow of media content. Additionally, 
there is a specific branch of research directed at “message system analysis” (Gerbner et 
al., 1984). For message system analysis, a week’s worth of network television drama are 
recorded armually and analyzed to determine the world that is being presented on 
television.
In light of research findings that network television shows violence to occur at 
least ten times as frequently as it does in the real world, it is understandable that heavy 
viewers of television might believe that violence occurs more frequently (Gerbner et al., 
1984). Gerbner and his colleagues have noted other intrigumg discrepancies between the 
television world and the real world. For example, television dramas do not include nearly 
as many elderly people as exist in the real world, fit cultivation analysis, Gerbner, Gross,
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Morgan, and Signorielli (1980) found that heavy viewers are more likely to believe that 
there are fewer elderly than there used to be and that they don’t live as long.
Other message analysis research conducted during the 1980s found that there are 
three men for every woman on television network dramas. Women on television tend to 
be younger than their male counterparts. In cultivation analysis, researchers found that 
most groups of heavy viewers hold more sexist attitudes and beliefs than light viewers 
(Gerbner et al., 1984).
Young people depend on television for information about politics and government. 
As Chaffee and Frank (1996) note, “Television is the principal channel by which young 
people in America and other Western democracies first encounter politics” (p. 56). If 
cultivation theory is correct, important differences between light and heavy viewers of 
television might be found for a variety of issues, beliefs, and attitudes. As this study 
deals specifically with politics and government, it will focus on the way that television 
portrays politics and government
Negative Election Coverage on Television
Much communication research has focused on political coverage on network 
television during presidential campaigns. Lichter, Noyes, and Kaid (1999) looked at the 
candidates’ “sound bites”—the amount of time that candidates’ images were shown on 
screen accompanied by their words. In 1968, the average “sound bite” was 42 seconds 
(Patterson, 1993). In 1996, the candidates’ “sound bites” averaged only about 82 
seconds. Journalists covermg the campaign had about six times as much anthne as the 
candidates themselves, which thqr spent in discussmg and analyzing the campaign. The
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tone of the discussions and analysis was negative, for the most part, especially the 
coverage of Bob Dole (Lichter, Noyes, & Kaid, 1999).
Patterson (1993) argued that journalist’s coverage of politics is organized by a 
specific schema—the idea that “politics is a strategic game” (p. 57). Within this schema, 
candidates’ actions and words are evaluated in terms of their strategic importance to 
getting elected. This type of coverage has become much more prevalent in the past thirty 
years (Patterson, 1993). As a result, Americans who rely on the media for information on 
politics find out much more about candidate strategies than they do about their 
substantive stands on various issues. These strategies are often portrayed in cynical 
terms. Graber (1984) found that when news stories focused on issues, people were more 
likely to want to take action. On the other hand, when news stories focused on the game, 
people felt less involved and felt more resigned to candidates’ behavior.
In Out of Order. Patterson (1993) wrote about the increasmgly negative tone that 
journalists take toward politics and the consequences it has for the American electorate. 
According to Patterson, during the 1992 election,
. . .  more than 80 percent of network news stories on the Democratic party were 
negative; 87 percent of all references to the Republican party were unfavorable. 
Congress was portrayed as a human cesspool: 90 percent of news regarding it was 
bad. The federal government fared even worse: 93 percent negative (p. 18). 
Cultivation theory suggests that this overwhelmingly negative depiction of both 
politicians and government institutions should have an effect over time on television 
viewers. As negative coverage of politics and politicians has increased markedly over the 
course of the past thirty years (Patterson, 1993), young viewers might be particularly
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affected by it, having never experienced a more positive media depiction of politics. 
Therefore, this study will explore the following hypothesis:
H4: Heavy use of television by students is positively related to negative 
assessments of politics and politicians.
NegativeCampaigns
Some scholars argue that like the press, politicians and their campaigns on 
television have contributed to Americans’ lack of confidence in govermnent. In Why 
Americans Hate Politics. E. J. Dionne (1991) contends that political advertisements have 
become increasingly negative. Ideally, our form of government should focus on what 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called “the search for remedy” (Dionne, 1991, p. 16), looking 
toward solutions to real problems in the country. However, Dionne believes that since the 
1960s, liberals and conservatives have consistently focused in political advertisements on 
character attacks and divisive issues that leave Americans feeling frustrated. Dionne 
(1991) writes:
The decline of a “politics of remedy” creates of vicious cycle. Campaigns have 
become negative in large part because of a sharp decline in popular faith in 
government. To appeal to an increasmgly alienated electorate, candidates and their 
political consultants have adopted a cynical stance that, they believe with good 
reason, plays into popular cynicism about politics and thus wins them votes. But 
cynical campaigns do not resolve issues. They do not lead to “remedies.” 
Therefore, problems get worse, the electorate becomes more cynical—and so does
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the advertising. At the end of it all, the governing process, which is supposed to 
be about real things, becomes little more than a war over symbols, (p. 17) 
According to this argument, the symbols that have become important in political 
advertising are not relevant to competence in government. The public realizes that these 
merely symbolic issues are not important, and become less trusting as a result (Dionne, 
1991).
Pfau et al. (1998) assert that Robinson (1975,1976, 1977) started the line of 
studies that first focused the relationship between television and lack of trust in 
institutions. Robinson coined the term “videomalaise” to describe the effect that 
television had on its viewers. He believed that the increasingly negative tone of news 
coverage caused viewers to feel cynical. Robinson (1976) wrote the following about the 
news coverage of American institutions: “It seems reasonable to assume that these anti- 
institutional themes reach the audience with one essential message: none of our national 
policies work, none of our institutions respond, none of our political organizations 
succeed (p. 429, in Pfau et al., 1998, p. 92).
Jamieson, Waldman, and Devett (1998) write that both the campaigners and news 
coverage of the campaign exacerbated the problem for viewers in 1996. Politicians 
avoided the press and distorted their opponents’ views. The news media continued to 
focus on strategy instead of issues. Coverage also over-reported the attacks that 
candidates made on each other. At the same time, news coverage did not report the 
inaccuracies that were present m the political advertisements.
As heavy television viewers caimot avoid presidential campaigns and the strategic 
coverage of govermnent, the following prediction was made:
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H5: Heavy use of television by students is negatively related to trust in 
government institutions.
Modified Cultivation Theory
While Gerbner’s cultivation theory suggests that mass media presents users with a 
relatively homogenous view of the world, other communication scholars, such Hawkins 
and Pingree (1981) and Potter (1993) have argued against this view. These researchers 
assert that “the cultivation of perceptions should be unique to content genres” (Pfau et al., 
1998, p. 94). Pfau et al. (1998) used a modified form of the cultivation theory in their 
quantitative study of how mass media use affects public confidence in democratic 
institutions. The study included a content analysis of television news, print media, and 
political talk radio. These researchers found that “users of specific communication 
sources tend to perceive institutions as those sources depict them, sometimes positively, 
or, as in the case of national television news and political talk radio, negatively” (p. 107).
In this study, Pfau et al. (1998) presented their content analysis findings about 
which communication sources presented institutions in the most negative light. When 
looking at coverage of the Office of the Presidency, they found that network television 
news was more negative than local television news. They found that depictions of the 
Presidency were even more negative on television entertainment talk shows, such as Late 
Night with David Letterman and The Tonight Show with Jav Leno. Whenlookmgat 
coverage of Congress, th ^  found that the most negative depiction occurred on the 
entertainment talk shows, and that netwodc news was again more negative than local 
news.
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In a study that focused on how television viewing is related to civic engagement, 
Norris (1996) looked at the total amount of time viewers spent watching television. She 
also looked at which television programs viewers watched, including television news and 
public affairs programs. Norris found that heavy viewers of television were “less 
interested in national and local community politics, and less likely to engage in political 
discussions” (p. 476). However, she also found that viewers of network news and public 
affairs programs were “more likely to be involved in all types of political activity. . . ” (p. 
476).
Norris’s study suggests that television use may have a negative effect on political 
activity, but that the specific content of the types of television programs that viewers 
watch may override this generally negative effect. Norris, however, looked at two genres 
that would appeal to those most apt to be interested in politics—network news and 
public affairs programs. This study will examine how political activity is related to 
viewing different types of programs, such as late night television talk shows and political 
talk shows. The study will also examine the relationship between the types of television 
programs that students watch and their attitudes toward govenunent.
Participants have answered questions about what sorts of programs they watch, 
so that the following research question may be addressed.
RQl ; What is the relationship between political involvement and the types of 
television programs that students watch?
RQ2: What is the relationship between attitudes toward government and the 
types of television programs that studoits watch?
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METHODOLOGY
Design
The principal questions that this study explores concern the relationship between 
television viewing and political attitudes and political involvement. The study has been 
developed for a thesis and has been conducted through survey research. The surveys were 
handed out to students during class time and in their usual classrooms. The surveys were 
administered in late March, 2000—after many major primaries in the 2000 presidential 
election had taken place.
Participants
The participants for this study are undergraduate students at University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. There were approximately 50 students who filled out the survey in 
two sections of an interpersonal communication classes and about 40 students who filled 
out the survey in two sections of a speech communication class. Approximately another 
20 students filled out the survey in an introductory course on gender, race, and class. The 
students were selected non-randomly—as undergraduate students, they were readily 
available for research. The Office of Sponsored Programs at the University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas approved the project, after reviewing the protocol.
35
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Measurement
The survey mcludes forty-eight close-ended questions (see Appendix 1). The 
questions, except where indicated, were adapted from items used in the American 
National Election Study (ANES) surveys from 1964 through 1992. These questions 
appear in Craig (1996, pp. 295-300).
The first section of the survey measures political and ideological self- 
identification. For the first question, participants indicated whether they identified with 
any political party by circling (1) Republican; (2) Democrat; (3) Independent; or (4) none 
of the above. In the next question, participants indicated on a seven-point scale where 
they would place their political views, with (1) indicating extremely liberal and (7) 
indicating extremely conservative.
So that the study could measure their level of trust in government, students then 
marked on two 7-point scales where they would place their own attitude toward politics 
and politicians. On the first of these scales, 1 = not at all cynical and 7 = extremely 
cynical. In the next scale, 1 = not at all trusting and 7 -  extremely trusting. These two 
questions were not adapted fix>m previous ANES surveys.
In the next section of the survey, participants answered a series of questions 
designed to measure their level of political involvement These questions, again, were 
adapted from items used in the ANES surveys (Craig, 1996, pp. 295-300).
Ffrst for item 5, participants indicated how often th ^  fr)llow what’s going on in 
government and public afiairs, using a scale in which 1 = most of the time and 4 = hardly 
at all. Next, for item 6, participants indicated how mterested they have been in the 
presidential campaign so far this year, usmg a scale m which I = very much interested and
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4 = not at all interested. Then, for item 7, participants indicated how much they 
personally care about who wins the presidential election this fall, using a scale in which I 
= very much and 4 = not at all.
For items 8-11, students answered questions about how often they paid attention 
to the campaign through different communication chaimels. For each of these questions, 
participants used a scale in which 1 = daily; 2 = 3-5 times a week; 3 = once or twice a 
week; 4 = once or twice a month; and 5 = rarely. For question 8, participants marked 
how often they listen to speeches, debates, or discussions about the campaign on the 
radio. For question 9, participants marked how often they pay attention to information 
about the campaign on the Internet. For question 10, students marked how often they 
watch programs about the campaign on television. For question 11, they marked how 
often they discuss politics with family or friends.
For question 12, students used the above scale to indicate how often they will talk 
to people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or 
candidates during the campaign.
Participants indicated their responses by marking (1) yes or (2) no for questions 
13-17. For question 13, they indicated whether they would wear a campaign button, put 
a campaign sticker on their car, or place a sign in their window or in the front of their 
house. For question 14, students marked whether they would go to any political 
meetings, rallies, speeches, diimers, or things like that in support of a particular candidate. 
For question 15, participants indicated whether th^r would do any other work for one of 
the parties or candidates. For question 16, partic^ants answered whether th ^  listened 
to radio shows where people call in to voice their opmions. Finally, for question 17,
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students indicated whether they watch talk shows on T. V. where people call in to voice 
their opinions.
All of these items on political involvement (items 5 — 17) were then used to create 
an index of political involvement. This index has an alpha reliability of .8624. The mean 
for this index is 37.8131, and the range is 27.00.
In the following section of the survey, participants answered a series of questions 
designed to measure their feelings of political efficacy. For questions 18-22, participants 
indicated their reaction to each one of a series of statements using a five-point scale in 
which 1 = agree strongly and 5 = disagree strongly. The statements were as follows: (18) 
“I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our 
coimtry;” (19) “1 consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics;” (20) “I feel 
that 1 could do as good a job in public office as most other people;” (21) “1 think I am 
better informed about politics and government than most people;” and (22) “Sometimes 
politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really 
understand what’s going on.” Items 18-21 were then used to create an index of political 
efficacy, which has an alpha reliability of .8340. The mean for this index is 13.1009, and 
the range is 16.00.
The next section of the survey measures general attitudes about govermnent and 
politics. For question 23, participants indicated how much of the time they think they 
can trust the government in Washington to do what is right by marking (1) always; (2) 
most of the tune; or (3) only some of the time. For question 24, students marked whether 
they think that people in the government waste tæc mon^ by circling (1) they waste a lot
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of the money; (2) they waste some of the money; or (3) they don’t waste very much of 
the money.
For question 25, participants indicated their attitude about how the government is 
run by circling (1) It’s run by a few big interests looking out for themselves; or (2) It’s 
run for the benefit of all the people. For question 26, students marked how many 
crooked people they think there are miming the government by circling (1) quite a few;
(2) not very many; or (3) hardly any.
For question 27, participants indicated whether they think that public officials 
care much what people like them think by circling (1) yes, they care very much, (2) they 
care some, or (3) no, they don’t care much. For both questions 28 and 29, participants 
chose from the following answers; (I) a good deal; (2) some; or (3) not much. Question 28 
addresses how much attention they feel the government pays to what the people think 
when it makes decisions by circling. Question 29 addresses how much they feel that 
having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think.
For questions 30 and 31, students indicated their reaction to statements by using 
a seven-point scale where 1 = limited interest and 7 = a great deal of interest The 
statements are as follows: (30) “How much interest would you say you have in the 
Office of the Presidency?”; and (31) “How much interest would you say you have in 
Congress?” Interest in government institutions is an important variable in the study.
For questions 32 and 33, students indicated their answers usmg a five-point scale 
in which 1 = approve strongly and 5 = distqiprove strongly. Question 32 asks how 
students foel about the way the president is handling his job. Question 33 asks how 
students foel about the way that members of Congress are handling their jobs. These
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questions were included to measure students’ assessments of politicians, another 
important variable for this study.
For question 34, students indicated how often they used different media by using 
a scale of 1 through 10, where 1 means “rarely” and 10 means “frequently.” They marked 
responses for local TV news, network TV news, late-night TV entertainment talk shows, 
TV political talk shows, and Internet news sources.
Questions 35 and 36 were not adapted from the ANES surveys. These questions 
are designed to address the issue of whether the political coverage currently available 
through media addresses yoimg people. Students indicated their responses using a scale 
in which 1 = very often; 2 = sometimes; and 3 = rarely. They answered how often they 
feel that political issues covered on television are relevant for their age group and how 
often they feel that shows with political content are targeted toward their age group.
In the next section, items 37 and 38 measure amount of media use. Students 
answered either (I) one hour or less; (2) two or three hours; or (3) four or more hours to 
questions about how many hours a day they spend watching TV and how many hours a 
day they spend on the Internet Amount of television viewing is a critical variable for this 
study. For the purposes of this study, students watching TV one hour or less are 
considered light viewers. Those watching TV two or three hours a day are considered 
moderate viewers. Those watchmg TV for four or more hours are considered heavy 
viewers. These labels are based on the work of Gerbner et al. (1984).
The remaining questions are for demographic purposes and for information on 
voting behavior. For question 39, participants mdicated how old they were so that it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
would be possible to look at age as a variable. They marked one of the following 
categories: (1)18-21; (2) 22-29; (3) 30-39; (4) 40-49; (5) 50-59; (6) 60 or older.
For question 40, participants answered yes (2) or no (1) to show whether they 
were old enough to vote in the last presidential election. Participants then answered 
whether or not they voted in the last presidential election. If they answered yes to 
voting, they then circled who they voted for-(l) Clinton, (2) Perot, (3) Dole, or (4) other. 
This question was included as one indication of prior political involvement.
For question 43, participants circled (1) no, (2) maybe, or (3) yes to show 
whether or not they planned to vote in the next presidential election. If they answered 
yes to planning to vote, they then circled who they planned to vote for—(1) Gore, (2) 
Bush, or (3) other. This question was included as another indication of political 
involvement
For question 45, participants circled whether they were (1) male or (2) female, so 
that sex could be looked at as a variable. For question 46, participants circled (1) no or 
(2) yes to show whether or not they had children. This question was included so that it 
would be possible to look at whether or not specific attitudes toward politics and 
politicians were correlated with parenthood. For question 47, participants circled (1) no 
or (2) yes to show whether they were married.
Finally, for question 48, participants indicated their race, by marking one the 
following six groups: 1 ) White; 2) Afiican-American; 3) Asian American/Pacfiic Islander; 
4) Latino/Mexican-American; 5) Native American; 6) Other (please specify).
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Procedure
The researcher asked participants to fill out the surveys at the beginning of their 
classes- First, the instructor made a brief announcement, explaining to students what the 
research was for, assuring them that it was voluntary, and promising to share the results 
with them. Then, the instructor handed the survey (see Appendix 1) along with a cover 
letter to students. Students completed the survey in fifteen to twenty minutes.
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RESULTS 
An Overview of Responses
The Subjects
There were 109 students surveyed. Of these students, 36% (39) were male and 
64% (70) were female. Most of these respondents were fairly young—61.5% (67) were 
between 18 and 21,27.5% (30) were between 22 and 29,6.4% (7) were between 30-39, 
and just 4.6% (5) were 40-49 years old. Most respondents, about 83% (90), were not 
married. The vast majority, 88% (96) of respondents, did not have children. The sample 
was fairly diverse—about 69% (75) of those surveyed identified themselves as white, 
about 5% (5) as Afiican American, about 14%(14) as Asian American/Pacific Islander, 
about 6% (7) as Latino or Mexican, and about 2% (2) as Native American.
Political Self-Identification and Election Items
In terms of their partisan identification, about 36% (39) of the participants 
thought of themselves as Republican, about 32% (34) as Democrats, and about 11% (12) 
as Independents. About 21% (22) of respondents did not think of themselves as falling 
into any of these party categories.
43
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About 28% (31) of respondents care very much who wins the presidential election 
this year and approximately 42% (46) care somewhat However, this concern may not 
translate into a great deal of action. In terms of trying to persuade others about who to 
vote for, 77% (84) indicated that they would rarely talk to other people and try to show 
them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates. About 84% 
(92) of respondents marked that they would not wear a campaign button, put a campaign 
sticker on their car, or place a sign in the window or in front of the house. About 80%
(87) marked that they would not go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or 
things like that in support of a candidate. Approximately another 82% (88) indicated that 
they would not do any other work for one of the parties or candidates.
On the other hand, about 57% (62) of students plan to vote in the next presidential 
election. About 28% (31) answer “maybe” to voting, while about 15% (16) do not plan 
to vote. For those who do plan to vote, about 34% (23) plan to vote for Gore and about 
49% (33) plan to vote for Bush. About 16% (11) marked “other.” This is striking 
because of the predominance of women in the survey sample. Perhaps the gender gap, 
which would predict that women would be more likely to vote for Democrats than 
Republican candidates, is shifting ground in this race. Of the approximately 28% (31) of 
students who voted in the last presidential election, about 68% (21) voted for Clinton, 
while only about 23% (7) voted for Dole.
Media Use and Political Coverage
On an average day, about 16% (17) of respondents watch television fr)r four or 
more hours, about 46% (50) for 2 or 3 hours, and 38.5% (42) for one hour or less. About
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32% (35) of respondents believe that political issues covered on television are rarely 
relevant for their age group, and about 43% (47) believe that shows with political content 
are rarely targeted toward their age group.
Just 5.5% (6) of students spend four or more hours on the Internet, while about 
24% (26) spend 2 or 3 hours, and about 71% (77) spend one hour or less on the Internet.
Statistical Analysis of the Data
The Hvpotheses
The hypotheses and research questions explored here have to do with television 
viewing and political involvement, interest, efBcacy, and trust. To test each of the 
following hypotheses, a bivariate correlation was used.
The first hypothesis predicted that students' heavy use of television would be 
negatively related to feelings of political efBcacy. No significant relationship was found 
between the number of hours students spent watching television and their feelings of 
political efBcacy, which were measured through an index of items described in Chapter 3 
(r = .152, p = .114). Interestingly, however, the study did find significant relationships 
between feelings of political efBcacy and types of television programs that students 
watch. Frequent viewing of local television news was sîgnffîcantly related to feelings of 
political efBcacy (r=-231, with p < .05). Frequent viewmg of network television news 
was also significantly related to foelmgs of political efBcacy (rj= -.317, p < .05). Finally, 
frequent viewmg of television political talk shows, such as larrv King, was significantly 
related to feelings of political efBcacy (r= -.414, p < .01). Frequent viewers of local
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news, network news, and political talk shows have feelings of greater political efBcacy 
than do infrequent viewers.
The second hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be 
negatively related to interest in politics and government No correlation was found 
between the number of hours spent watching television and any of the three measures of 
interest in politics. The first item measured students’ self-reported interest level in 
politics (r = .050, p = .608). The second item measured students’ interest in the Office of 
the Presidency (r= .057, p = .553). The third item measured students’ interest in 
Congress (r = .002, p = .980). On the other hand, the study did find significant 
relationships between the types of television programs that students watched for all three 
measures. Those who frequently watch local news report a higher interest level in politics 
and politicians than less frequent viewers (r = -.189, p < .05). Those who frequently 
watch network news also report a higher interest in politics and politicians than less 
frequent viewers (r = -223, p < .05). Likewise, those who watch political talk shows 
report a higher interest in politics and politicians (r -J27, p = .001).
Students who watch political talk shows are more interested than less frequent 
viewers in the Office of the Presidency (r = 220, p < .05) and in Congress (r = .305, p < 
.01). Significant relationship were also found between frequent viewing of television 
network news and mterest in the Office of the Presidency (r = .312, p < .01), as well as 
interest in Congress (r=  289, p < .05). Frequent viewers of local news report higher 
interest in the Office of the Presidency (r=234, p < .05). These frequent viewers of 
local news were also more likely to be mterested m Congress (r = 229, p < .05).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
The third hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be 
negatively related to political involvement. In order to test this hypothesis, the researcher 
used an index of involvement, which had an alpha reliability of .8624. No significant 
relationship was found between the number of hours spent watching television and 
political involvement (r = .052, p = .593). Again, however, the study found significant 
relationships between the types of television programs which students watched and their 
political involvement. See the following section on Research Questions for more 
information.
The fourth hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be 
positively related to negative assessments of politics and politicians. Although no 
significant relationship was found between television use and assessments of Congress (r 
= .111. p =.252). there was a significant relationship between television use and 
assessments of the President (r = -200, p < .037). However, the relationship runs 
counter to that which was predicted—the more television that participants watch, the 
more likely they are to give the president a positive Job approval rating.
The fifth hypothesis predicted that heavy use of television would be negatively 
related to trust in government. The study found no significant relationship between the 
number of hours spent watching television and any of the six measures of trust. The first 
item measured attitudes of trust toward politics and politicians (r = .082, p = 269). The 
second item measured cynical attitudes toward politics and politicians (r = ,072, p =
.457). The third item measured how often the respondent trusted the government in 
Washington to do what is right (r = .055, p = 296). The fourth item measured whether 
the respondent believes government wastes a lot of tax money (r - .058, p = .573). The
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fifth item measured whether the participant believes the government was run by a few big 
interests or for the benefit of all the people (r = .016, p = .873). The sixth item measured 
the respondent’s belief about how many people in the government are crooked (r = -.089, 
p = .358). Although none of these measures were correlated to the number o f hours that 
the students spent watching TV, significant relationships were found between the types of 
television programs that students watched and their feelings of trust in government. Read 
the following section on the Research Questions for more information.
The Research Questions
The two research questions explore how the types of television programs which 
students watch relate to their general levels of political engagement, which includes 
involvement in politics and positive attitudes toward politics and government. The first 
question asked about the relationship between the ^ e s  of television programs which 
students watch and political involvement. No correlation was found between how 
frequently viewers watched late night entertainment talk shows and their political 
involvement (r = .080, p = .420). A strong correlation (r = -.319, p < .01) was found 
between how frequently participants viewed local news and their political involvement. 
Similarly, a strong correlation (r = -280, p < .01) was found between how frequently 
participants viewed network news and their political involvement. Finally, a strong 
correlation was found between how frequently respondents view political talk shows and 
then: political involvement -.435, p < . 01 at .000).
The second research question asked about the relationsh^ between attitudes 
toward government and the types of television programs that students watch. The study
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found some significant relationships. First, local television news viewing was negatively 
related to trust that the government in Washington will do what is right (r = 254, p <
.01). Those who watch local television news frequently are more apt to believe that you 
can trust the government in Washington only some of the time.
Second, a significant relationship was found between viewing of late-night 
entertainment talk shows and attitudes toward politics and politicians. More frequent 
viewing of late-night entertainment talk shows such as Late Night with David Letterman 
and The Tonight Show was negatively related to high levels of cynicism toward politics 
and politicians (r = -210, p < .05). Frequent viewing of these late-night entertainment 
talk shows was positively related to high levels of trust toward politics and politicians (r 
=230, p < .05). That is, those who frequently watch late-night talk shows are less apt to 
be cynical and more apt to be trusting toward politics and politicians than less-frequent 
viewers.
Finally, a moderately strong correlation was found between the president’s job 
approval rating and viewing of political talk shows (r = -.191, p < .05). Those who watch 
political talk shows frequently are more apt to give the president a higher job approval 
rating.
These findings will be highlighted and discussed in Chapter 5.
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DISCUSSION
Summary of Findings 
This study has demonstrated that there seems to be no relationship between the 
overall amount of television which students watch and their political involvement, their 
sense of efficacy, and their interest in politics. The study also has demonstrated that 
there is some relationship between the types of television programs which students watch 
and their attitudes toward politics and politicians. Finally, the study has demonstrated 
that there is also some relationship between the types of television programs which 
students watch and their political involvement. In this chapter, the findings for each of 
the hypotheses and research questions will be highlighted and discussed.
Discussion of Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Contrary to previous research findings (Norris, 1996), this study found no support 
for the first hypothesis, which predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be 
negatively related to feelings of political efficacy. The lack of support for this and for the 
hypotheses that follow may result from limitations within, the study itself. One of the 
limitations of the study is the feet that a convenience sample was used. This sample may 
not be representative of the average college student. These students may also be
50
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unrepresentative in that many of the students work full time—thus, they have less time to 
watch television. Indeed, although Fukuyama (1999) writes that the average American 
watches television for four or more hours a day, only about 16% (17) of the 109 student 
respondents answered that they watched for that amount of time. Of course, it is 
possible that students gave what they considered to be the socially desirable response, 
which might seem to be a lighter amount of television viewing.
The study found no support for the second hypothesis, which predicted that 
students’ heavy use of television would be negatively related to interest in politics and 
government. This finding is contrary to Norris’s (1996) study, in which she found that 
heavy viewers were less interested in politics and government than light viewers. As 
stated above, only a very small sample of the survey population admitted to being heavy 
viewers. On the other hand, quite a large number of students (54% or 59 students) 
placed themselves toward the uninterested end of the scale measuring interest level in 
politics. Because this study focuses mainly on young adults, perhaps there were more 
participants uninterested in politics on the whole, regardless of their television-viewing 
habits.
The third hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be 
negatively related to political involvement. Contrary to Putnam’s (1995) research which 
indicated that heavy viewmg was associated with lower voter turnout and less voter trust, 
no support was found for this hypothesis. This is somevfeat surprising, especially given 
Graberis (1984) findings that when more news stories are presented on the “game” of 
politics than on issues, as news stories currently do, viewers feel less involved.
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No support was found for the fourth hypothesis, which predicted that students’ 
heavy use of television would be positively related to negative assessments of politics 
and politicians. In fact, the students who spent more time watching television were more 
likely to give the president a positive ]oh approval rating. One might speculate that this is 
because the current president, with his telegenic communication skills, is able to override 
the negative coverage generally given to the Office of the Presidency. It will be 
interesting to see if, as presidents change in the years to come, heavy viewers will 
continue to be more likely to give the current president a higher approval rating.
The fifth hypothesis predicted that students’ heavy use of television would be 
negatively related to trust in government In earlier studies, Putnam (1995) did find a 
relationship between heavy television viewing and decreased voter trust and Robinson 
(1975,1976,1977) found an association between television news viewing and loss of 
trust for the government However, no support was found for the fifth hypothesis in this 
study.
The study also posed the following research question: What is the relationship 
between attitudes toward government and the types of television programs that students 
watch? Interestingly, those students who fiequently watch local news were more apt to 
believe that they can trust the government in Washington to do what is right only some o f 
the time (as opposed to always or most of the time). This finding is somewhat surprising 
given Pfau et al.’s (1998) content analysis, which showed that television local news is 
less negative toward Congress and the President than network news. It is possible that 
local news in Nevada provides a particularly negative view of the government in 
Washmgton, with its often predominantly negative coverage of the Bureau of Land
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Management and the Department of Energy. However, this study did not include any 
content analysis of Las Vegas local news to back up such speculation.
A more surprising finding is that those students who frequently watch late night 
entertainment talk shows feel more trusting toward politics and politicians than less 
frequent viewers, given the fact that on these shows, politicians are regularly joked about 
and generally referred to derisively. In fact, Pfau et al. (1998) found that entertainment 
talk shows depicted both Congress and the Presidency more negatively than any of the 
other types of shows they looked a t Yet it is clear that politicians find these shows 
useful—just this year, both John McCain and George Bush appeared on late-night talk 
shows during the 2000 presidential primary race. In his race for New York senator. New 
York City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani has appeared several times on Late Show with David 
Letterman. Hillary Clinton has also appeared with Letterman, just as her husband 
famously appeared playing the saxophone on Arsenio Hall’s talk show. Perhaps as more 
politicians use these shows to appeal directly to the viewers, the viewers respond by 
feeling greater trust toward them. This would support van Zoonen’s (1998) thesis that 
mastery of popular culture has become and will continue to be increasingly important for 
politicians.
The study also posed the following research question: What is the relationship 
between political involvement and the ^ e s  of television programs that students watch? 
The findings were clear: Those who frequently watch local television news, network 
news, and political talk shows have a higher involvement level in politics than those who 
watch less often. This runs contrary to predictions based on the woric of Putnam, which 
suggests that television viewing m general will be accompanied by a lessening of civic
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participation. However, one of Norris’s (1996) findings was similar. In her study, she 
found that “Those who regularly tuned into the network news were significantly more 
likely to be involved in all types of political activity. . . ” (Norris, 1996, p. 476).
One of the suppositions underlying my hypotheses was that young people are 
getting their political cues from television (as opposed to their families or political 
parties). These yoimg people, it has been argued, feel that the media and political 
marketing forces are ignoring them. Therefore, if they are spending a great deal of time 
watching television, they are more likely to become disengaged from politics. Indeed, 
this study found that those who are least involved in politics are most likely to feel that 
television political coverage is not targeted toward their age group and that television 
political cover%e is not relevant for their age group. However, the study also found that 
those students who do frequently watch television news and political talk shows are more 
likely to feel that political coverage on television is targeted to and relevant for their age 
group. In an era where political discussions take place less often and party loyalty is 
diminishing, perhaps television actually sometimes serves to promote interest in politics.
Suggestions for Future Research 
Given the findings of this study, future research might focus more specifically on 
how viewing television network news and political talk shows are related positively to 
political mvolvement and efficacy. Are students who are more interested in politics more 
inclined to watch television coverage of politics? Since this study found that those who 
watch these shows tend to be more involved and interested in politics, it would also be
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interesting to look more closely at the reasons why some students choose not to watch 
these shows.
Another interesting finding to pursue is the relationship between frequent viewing 
of local television news and feelings that the government in Washington can be trusted to 
do what is right only some of the time. Is this distrust unique to the student population in 
Nevada, or might it be more generalizable? It would be useful to study this relationship 
in several different areas of the country, while doing content analyses of the local news in 
those areas to see how coverage might differ.
Finally, future research might look more closely at the relationship between 
frequent viewing of late-night entertainment talk shows and greater feelings of trust 
toward politics and politicians. Which shows specifically seem to encourage these 
feelings of greater trust? Are they shows where politicians themselves frequently appear? 
Would this relationship change over time—for example, would this relationship exist 
during a major political scandal, such as the Clinton/Lewinslty affair? Future research 
might look at the relationship during off-year elections as well, when not as many 
prominent politicians would appear on the talk shows. MacManus (1996) wrote that one- 
quarter of Americans between 18 and 29 watch these shows fairly often and a third of 
these viewers admit that these shows are sometimes their first source of news about 
campaigns and candidates. For those young people who are not regularly viewing 
television news and political talk shows, these talk shows still seem to provide some 
important cues about politics and politicians.
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Conclusions
The findings of this study would indicate that Norris (1996) is correct when she 
suggests that the relationship between television viewing and engagement “is more 
complex than sometimes suggested” (p. 479). The study’s findings do not seem to 
support Putnam’s (1994,1995) work, which posits that the amount of time people spend 
watching television is a root cause of civic disengagement.
The study also supports the modified approach to the cultivation theory, which 
suggests that “the cultivation of perceptions should be unique to content genres ” (Pfau et 
al, 1998, p. 94). That is, the sheer amount of time students spend watching television in 
general seems to be less important than the types of programs they are watching in 
determining their level of political engagement. However, Pfau et al.’s (1998) study 
provided support for the notion that “users of specific communication sources tend to 
perceive institutions as those sources depict them, sometimes positively, or as in the case 
of national television news and political talk radio, negatively” (p. 107). Their content 
analyses of specific types of programs showed that late-night talk shows depicted both 
Congress and the Presidency in a negative light. The current study, on the other hand, 
found that students who watched television late-night entertainment talk shows feel 
greater trust toward politics and politicians. It would be useful to figure out the reason 
for such a discrepancy. One interesting possibility is that, in this age of celebrity- 
worship, students’ understanding of what counts as a negative depiction might run 
counter to the expectations of researchers.
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Finally, the study suggests that both the amount of television viewing and the 
types of television programs which students watch do not seem to be related to students’ 
disengagement from politics. Indeed, those who watch television news and political talk 
shows feel more involved and more effective than less frequent viewers. Rather than 
being related to disengagement, then, television seems to provide opportunity for greater 
political engagement. If politicians, the news media, and the government itself could find 
a way through television to capture the interest of the members of Generation X and their 
younger brothers and sisters who are not currently watching television news and political 
talk shows, they might help to further the political engagement of these yoimg viewers.
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SURVEY
[The following questions were adapted from the American National Election Study 
(ANES) surveys from 1964-1992 (in Craig, 1996, p. 295-300)]
Please mark only one answer for each question.
Partisan Self-Identification
I. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a 
L Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent
4. none of the above
2. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are 
arranged from extremely liberal ( 1) to extremely conservative (7). Where would you 
place yourself on this scale?
extremely liberal  ___  ___ _________ _____ ___ extremely conservative
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Please place yourself on the following seven-point scales to indicate your attitude 
toward politics and politicians.
not at all cynical  ___  ___ _________ _____ ___ extremely cynical
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all trusting  ___  _____________ _____ ___ extremely trusting
I 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Please place yourself on this seven-point scale to indicate your interest level in 
politics.
extremely interested  ___           extremely uninterested
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Political Involvement
5. Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs
most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not Others aren’t that 
interested. Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public 
affairs
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. only now and then
4. hardly at all
6. Some people don’t pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? 
Would you say that watching the presidential campaign so far this year, you have 
been
1. very much interested
2. somewhat interested
3. not much interested
4. not at all interested
7. Would you say that you personally care about who wins the presidential election 
this fall
1. very much
2. somewhat
3. not much
4. not at all
8. How often do you listen to any speeches, debates, or discussions about the campaign 
on the radio?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
9. How often do you pay attention to information about the campaign on the Internet?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
10. How often do you watch any programs about the campaign on television?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
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II. How often do you discuss politics with your family or friends?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
12. During the campaign, how often will you talk to people and try to show them why 
they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?
1. daily
2. 3-5 times a week
3. once or twice a week
4. once or twice a month
5. rarely
13. During the campaign, would you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker 
on your car, or place a sign in your window or in the front of your house?
1.' Yes
2. No
14. During the campaign, would you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, 
dinners, or things like that in support of a particular candidate?
1. Yes
2. No
15. During the campaign, would you do any other work for one of the parties or 
candidates?
1. Yes
2. No
16. Do you listen to radio shows where people call in to voice their opinions?
I. Yes 
2- No
17. Do you watch talk shows on T. V. where people call in to voice their opinions?
1. Yes
2. No
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Effectiveness
Please circle only one answer for each question. Indicate your reaction to the 
following statements:
18.1 feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing 
our country.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
19.1 consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
20.1 feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
21.1 think I am better informed about politics and government than most people.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
22. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t 
really understand what’s going on.
1. agree strongly
2. agree
3. neutral
4. disagree
5. disagree strongly
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General Attitudes About Government and Politics 
Please mark only one answer for each question.
23. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington 
to do what is right?
1. always
2. most of the time
3. only some of the time
24. When it comes to taxes, do you think that people in the government waste a lot of 
the money, some of the money, or don’t waste very much of the money? Choose 
below.
1. they waste a lot of the money.
2. they waste some of the money
3. they don’t waste very much of the money
25. Would you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
1. It’s run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
2. It’s run for the benefit of all the people.
26. How many people running the government do you think are crooked?
1. quite a few
2. not very many
3. hardly any of them
27. Do you think that public officials care much what people like you think?
1. yes, they care very much
2. they care some
3. no, they don’t care much
28. Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what the 
people think when it decides what to do?
1. a good deal
2. some
3. not much
29. How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to 
what the people think?
1. a good deal
2. some
3. not much
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30. How much mterest would you say you have in the Office of the Presidency?
Limited Interest________________________________A Great Deal of Interest
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. How much interest would you say you have in Congress?
Limited Interest________________________________A Great Deal of Interest
I 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. Do you think the president is doing a good job? Mark how you feel about the way 
the president is handling his job.
1. approve strongly
2. approve
3. neutral
4. disapprove
5. disapprove strongly
33. Do you think that members of Congress are doing a good job? Mark how you feel 
about the way they are handling their jobs.
1. approve strongly
2. approve
3. neutral
4. disapprove
5. disapprove strongly
34. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means “rarely” and 10 means “frequently”:
• how often would you say you watch local TV news? ____
• how often would you say you watch network TV news? ____
how often would you say you watch late-night TV entertainment talk shows,
such as “Late N i^t with David Letterman” and “The Tonight Show”? ____
how often would you say you watch TV political talk shows such as “Larry 
King” and “Crossfire”? ____
how often would you say you visit Internet news sources?____
35. How often do you feel that political issues covered on television are relevant for 
your age group?
1. very often
2. sometimes
3. rarely
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36. How often do you feel that shows with political content are targeted toward your 
age group?
1. very often
2. sometimes
3. rarely
37. Generally, how many hours a day do you spend watching T. V.?
1. one hour or less
2. two or three hours
3. four or more hours
38. Generally, how many hours a day do you spend on the Internet?
1. one hour or less
2. two or three hours
3. four or more hours
The remaining questions are for demographic purposes andfor information on voting 
behavior.
39. How old are you?
1. 18 to 21
2. 22 to 29
3. 30 to 39
4. 40-49
5. 50-59
6. 60 or older
40. Were you old enough to vote in the last presidential election?
1. no
2. yes
41. Did you vote in the last presidential election?
1. no
2. yes
42. If yes, who did you vote for?
1. Clinton
2. Perot
3. Dole
4. Other__________________ (Please specify)
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43. Do you plan to vote in the next presidential election?
1. no
2. maybe
3. yes
44. If yes, who do you plan to vote for?
1. Gore
2. Bush
3. Other__________________(Please specify)
45. What is your sex?
1. male
2. female
46. Do you have children?
1. no
2. yes
47. Are you married?
1. no
2. yes
48. What is your race?
1. White (non-Latino)
2. African American
3. Asian American/Pacific Islander
4. Latino/Mexican American
6. Native American
7. Other____________________ (Please specify)
THANK YOU FORTAKING THE TIME TO BE A PART OF THIS SURVEY!
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TABLE 1
Pearson Correlations Between Television and Political Engagement Variables
TVHrs. Loc. News Netwk. News Ent. Tk. Pol. Tk.
Efficacy .152 -231* -.317* .121 -.414**
Int. in Pol. .050 -.189* -223* -.035 -.327**
Int. in Pres. .057 234* 312** .041 220*
Int. in Cong. .002 229* 289** -.114 305**
Involvmnt. .052 -.319** -380** .080 -.435**
Assessment o f Pres. -200 -.088 -.166 -.026 -.191*
Assessment of Cong. .III .015 -.090 -.025 .101
Cynicism Re: Pol. .072 .157 .139 -210* .165
Trust Re: Pol. .082 -.III .038 230* -.033
Trust Gov't in Wash. .055 254** .003 -.052 .018
Are Taxes Wasted .058 .093 .093 .059 -.030
Who Runs G ov't .016 -.079 .091 .073 -.167
G ov't Crooked -.089 .017 .181 .140 .094
*p<.05,**p<.01
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